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whether representations of other people’s 
perspective are embodied depends on diffi-
culty. They argue that the degree of symme-
try determines whether perspective taking 
is needed.
The Challenges
The Challenge To aCCounT for absTraCT 
ConCepTs
Most studies of E and G cognition have 
focused on concrete objects and actions. 
People can also represent and reason about 
abstract concepts that do not have many 
sensory–motor features, however, and there 
is not much evidence yet on grounding of 
abstract concepts in sensory–motor systems 
(for a review, see Pecher et al., 2011). Thus, 
critics have argued that current evidence does 
not fully account for abstract representation.
Some authors propose a theoretical solu-
tion. van Elk et al. (2010) challenged the 
reliance on representations and proposed 
an enactivist approach. They argued that 
the view of representations as simulations 
or re-enactment of previous experiences 
opens two problems. First, the necessity of 
sensory–motor systems for cognition has 
been disputed (e.g., Mahon and Caramazza, 
2008). Second, it fails to explain concepts 
beyond our motor repertoire, such as ani-
mal actions, or abstract words. The authors 
proposed that sensory–motor brain areas 
underlie prediction of actions, arguing in 
favor of a more procedural view of cogni-
tion. In contrast, Dove believed that “the 
notion of representation is too useful to 
give up.” Dove proposed to use the term 
dis-embodiment. Language is dis-embod-
ied because its sensory–motor features 
are unrelated to its meaning. According to 
Dove (2011), this dual functionality of lan-
guage is at the basis of generalization and 
abstraction.
Several papers addressed conceptual 
metaphor theory. Flusberg et al. (2010) pre-
sented a computational connectionist model 
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InTroduCTIon
In the last 10–15 years, the embodied and 
grounded (E and G) cognition approach 
has become widespread in all fields related 
to cognitive (neuro) science, and a lot of 
evidence has been collected. The approach 
proposes that cognitive activity is grounded 
in sensory–motor processes and situated in 
specific contexts and situations.
This special topic had two aims: first, 
give an idea of the field in its broadness. 
Second, focus on some challenges for E and 
G theories. The first important challenge is 
to account for understanding abstract con-
cepts and words. Evidence on the represen-
tation of concrete concepts is compelling, 
whereas evidence on abstract concepts is still 
scarce and limited to restricted domains. A 
second important challenge concerns the 
role of computational models. E and G 
theories of cognition need to formulate 
more precise hypotheses, and models help 
to constrain and specify in more detail the 
predictions and the claims advanced.
The fIeld In ITs broadness
Although the importance of sensory–motor 
grounding had already become apparent 
in philosophy and linguistics, only after a 
couple of influential theoretical papers in 
the late 1990s did cognitive psychology 
get involved seriously (Glenberg, 1997; 
Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998; Barsalou, 
1999; Pulvermüller, 1999). The idea that 
cognitive processes, such as those involved 
in language and memory, are grounded in 
the same systems as those used for percep-
tion and action has received much empirical 
support. This special topic presents a sam-
ple of the new and exciting empirical work 
in this field.
Grounding of language comprehension 
has been among the most compelling dem-
onstrations. Several papers further inves-
tigated the grounded or embodied nature 
of a variety of linguistic issues. Wellsby 
et al. (2010) showed that people recognize 
embodied insults faster than less embod-
ied insults. Hald et al. (2011) and Collins 
et al. (2011) using ERPs, both showed that 
the modality switch effect reflects modal-
ity differences in early meaning activation 
due to different sensory systems involved 
in the mental simulation. In an fMRI study, 
Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) showed that 
when people process motion language they 
simulate seeing motion and preparing for 
the actions that the situation requires. Thus, 
mental simulations are immediately affected 
by the sentence context. A similar conclu-
sion is drawn by van Dam et al. (2010) who 
showed that the immediate linguistic context 
modulates whether object names activate 
action simulations. In contrast, Hemeren 
and Thill (2011) found that visual percep-
tion of functional object use is little affected 
by knowledge of the object identity. Instead, 
participants used kinematic information 
such as velocity, acceleration, and changes 
in direction to segment the action. Marsh 
and Glenberg (2010) propose that people 
learn grammar by imitation, in particular 
neuromuscular tuning. Lynott and Connell 
(2010) propose a grounded model (embod-
ied conceptual combination, ECCo) for new 
combinations of familiar concepts such as 
elephant complaint. They argue that people 
mesh motor and perceptual affordances 
either in a destructive or non-destructive 
manner.
How do we understand other people? 
The social Simon effect supports the idea 
that we understand other people’s actions 
by representing them as our own. Dolk et al. 
(2011) and Vlainic et al. (2010) found that 
online information from another person is 
not necessary, suggesting that the effect is 
not due to co-representation of the other’s 
action but rather to awareness of a second 
location that highlights the congruency 
between stimulus location and response. 
Kessler and Rutherford (2010) showed that 
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because their  sensory–motor potential and 
limitations can be made similar to those of 
humans.
Instead of a system that has a full repre-
sentation of the environment, Rothkopf and 
Ballard (2010) proposed a system of simple 
visuomotor modules, learned through rein-
forcement, allowing rapid access to behavio-
ral primitives. The authors illustrate a credit 
assignment algorithm that solves the problem 
of calibrating different visuomotor modules 
while pursuing multiple goals. In contrast, 
Ursino et al. (2010) presented a two-store 
model of representation: a semantic store of 
topologically organized sensory–motor fea-
tures and a lexicon. Because attractors are 
not steady states but rather synchronized 
oscillations multiple objects can be repre-
sented at the same time. A time dependent 
Hebbian learning rule allows the model to 
learn the relationship between words and 
object features.
Parisi (2011) argued that current theories 
are limited because they ignore emotions, 
“the other half of the embodied mind.” He 
argued that robots endowed with emotional 
circuits reach higher level of performance 
and have better survival probability com-
pared to robots without emotion. Mizelle 
and Wheaton (2010) criticized current the-
ories for ignoring flexibility. Their modular 
MSAG model represents high plasticity and 
variability in tool selection and use.
ConClusIon
We believe this special topic has opened 
new perspectives, and gives us some indi-
cations of where the field of E and G cogni-
tion is going. First of all, it testifies that the 
domain has expanded rapidly. At the same 
time, however, researchers will have to solve 
some open issues, such as the questions of 
necessity and abstraction. This special topic 
presents many empirical, theoretical, and 
modeling approaches to these challenges. It 
is a proof of how lively and open the field is.
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of grounding time in the  representation of 
space. Kranjec and Chatterjee (2010) chal-
lenged the view that time is grounded in 
space and investigated grounding of tem-
poral concepts directly in neural areas dedi-
cated to time perception. Beside conceptual 
metaphor theory, new views emerge that 
argue for multiple representations and assign 
a specific role to language (e.g., Barsalou 
et al., 2008). Views differ, however, on the 
role of symbolic associations. Whereas Dove 
(2011) proposes that symbolic processing 
complements sensory–motor processing, 
others have argued that symbolic asso-
ciations merely provide shortcuts for more 
efficient task performance (Barsalou et al., 
2008). Pecher and Boot (2011) found that 
spatial attention was affected by number 
magnitude, but, contrary to what concep-
tual metaphor theory would predict, only for 
numbers in concrete contexts. Associative 
shortcuts might suffice for abstract magni-
tudes, whereas concrete magnitudes require 
deeper processing. Borghi et al. (2011) 
investigated how the kind of acquisition 
influenced representation of concrete and 
abstract novel words. Verbal information is 
more crucial to represent abstract concepts, 
manual information to represent concrete 
concepts. This is in line with the proposal 
that Words are social Tools (Borghi and 
Cimatti, 2009): labels and explanations are 
particularly helpful to learn abstract words, 
as they provide the glue helping us to keep 
together multifaceted experiences.
Barbey and Patterson (2011) addressed 
abstraction from a cognitive neuroscience 
perspective. They reviewed evidence that 
PFC extracts statistical regularities across 
experiences; these regularities are the basis 
for building abstract rules, such as causal 
beliefs. The underlying mechanism is given 
by a distributed neural network across both 
modality specific and associative areas. This 
mechanism can be activated also when 
stimuli are not present, thus causing a causal 
simulation of an event.
The Challenge of CompuTaTIonal models
The need for computational models 
emerges clearly. Pezzulo et al. (2011) argued 
that embodied robotics is the platform to 
test  embodied computational models inde-
pendent from the kind of modeling style 
– dynamic  models, Bayesian approaches, 
or connectionist models. Robots provide 
cognitive process models with constraints 
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